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* Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., United States District Judge 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 The government appeals from Thomas L. Monaco's 
sentence, contesting both the district court's application of, 
and its downward departure from the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the 
sentence and remand the cause to the district court.   
The Oxy-Comm Contract 
 In July 1986, the Department of Defense ("DoD") awarded 
Northern Precision Laboratories, Inc. ("NPL") a contract to 
produce a test set for an aircraft pilot's oxygen/communications 
mask ("Oxy-Comm").  Payments were to be by periodic reimbursement 
for a fixed percentage of costs, overhead and other expenses 
incurred, with the balance of the fixed price to be paid upon 
completion.  NPL's computerized accounting system was designed to 
track all costs incurred and assign them to the proper contract 
so progress payment request forms could be automatically 
generated.  To receive a progress payment, these forms merely had 
to be submitted to the DoD.  Although documentation for costs 
incurred was necessary in case of an audit, the form itself was 
sufficient for payment. 
 When NPL was awarded the Oxy-Comm contract, it was 
experiencing cash flow problems which made it difficult to 
satisfy NPL's working capital and net worth requirements under 
its loan agreements.  To keep NPL's credit intact, its president 
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and founder, Thomas L. Monaco, contacted the Cortec Group, an 
investment banking firm.  In 1985, Cortec loaned $250,000 to NPL 
in return for a $50,000 annual management consulting fee and 
stock warrants exercisable within five years.   
 Monaco decided that by billing labor to the Oxy-Comm 
contract before it was actually performed, he could improve NPL's 
cash flow situation.  To receive accelerated payments, Monaco had 
NPL's Accounting Department change his son's department number 
from Administration to Engineering, a direct labor 
classification.  Monaco directed his son to prepare labor sheets 
falsely indicating that he worked 1,000 hours on job number 845 
since August 1986.  Job number 845 corresponded to the Oxy-Comm 
contract, but Monaco's son did not know that.  The elder Monaco 
gave the labor sheets to NPL's Production Control Manager to be 
put into the computer system.  Monaco then submitted a false 
progress payment request to the DoD which included the extra 
hours reported by his son.  Monaco and his son generated four 
additional progress payment requests by simply repeating the 
procedure.  As a result of these false hours, NPL received 
approximately $140,000 in accelerated payments. 
The DESI Contract 
 NPL had earlier been awarded a subcontract from Sperry 
Corporation to produce a tracking system for NASA.  It had 
received most of the payments under this fixed price contract. 
Unfortunately for NPL, because of technical problems with the 
system, more work remained to be done.  Hoping to renegotiate the 
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Sperry contract and get paid for this work, NPL set up job number 
1040 to track the additional expenses it incurred. 
 Later, the DoD awarded NPL a contract to develop a 
digital end speed indicator ("DESI") to monitor the speed of 
naval aircraft taking off from carriers.  This fixed price 
contract was also payable under the progress payment system.  For 
reasons that are unclear, the DESI contract was also assigned job 
number 1040.0  Because of this numerical duplication, charges 
related to the Sperry overrun were billed to the DESI contract 
and resulted in improper progress payments.  A year later, Monaco 
discovered the error.  By then, NPL's financial condition had 
deteriorated to the point that it could not repay the money and 
Monaco permitted NPL to keep the unearned progress payments. 
 These acts nevertheless failed to help NPL's financial 
condition.  Monaco realized that NPL would need additional 
backing to successfully bid on upcoming contracts and again 
sought help from Cortec.  At Monaco's request, Cortec exercised 
the previously issued warrants.  After assuming control over NPL 
Cortec immediately ousted Monaco.  It then discovered the billing 
discrepancies and notified the authorities.  A few months later, 
Cortec placed NPL in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  As a result of the 
bankruptcy, what would have been merely an interest free loan 
from early payments ripened into a loss of over $381,000 to the 
United States. 
 
                     
0Monaco states that he did not assign the job number himself and 




 Monaco and his son were indicted.  Monaco pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and his son pleaded guilty 
to aiding and abetting a false statement.  Because part of 
Monaco's offense conduct took place after October 31, 1987,0 
sentence was imposed under the 1988 Sentencing Guidelines.0 
Beginning with a base offense level of six, the district court 
first added seven points under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(H) (1988) 
to reflect the size of the government's loss, then subtracted two 
points under section 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility. 
The court refused to apply the two-level enhancement for more 
than minimal planning, leaving Monaco with an offense level of 
eleven, which, with Monaco's criminal history category of I, 
would have resulted in a sentence of eight to fourteen months.   
 The district court then departed downward one 
additional level, making the following observations: 
 [T]here is some substance to what 
[defense counsel] says when he speaks of the 
essence of the offense was not to take money 
that NPL or Mr. Monaco was not entitled to, 
but to expedite payment and cut a corner. 
Well, I don't know if I accept that analogy 
in that form; but what really happened here 
is, Mr. Monaco fraudulently borrowed the 
                     
0The younger Monaco's conduct was completed by November 1, 1987; 
hence, he was sentenced under pre-Guidelines procedure to one 
year of probation. 
03.  Under the 1988 guidelines, the loss caused by Monaco's fraud 
would require a seven point enhancement, while under the 1992 
version, nine levels would be added.  Accordingly, the district 
court correctly chose to apply the 1988 guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.11(b)(1) (1992); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 
(3d Cir. 1991).  
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Government's money without paying any 
interest on it, hoping that in the end, 
things would work out, complete the work, 
keep his company afloat.  And he got a bad 
result; not something that is uncommon. . . . 
I believe Mr. Monaco's motives in this case 
were pure.  I don't believe that he did this 
to place money in his own pocket. . . . 
Basically, Mr. Monaco is a good person, 
probably the type of neighbor anyone would 
want. . . .  
 
 But in any event, but for this mistake, 
we have a very decent human being standing 
before the Court.  And so once again, this 
Court must strike a difficult balance in 
figuring out, well, what are we going to do 
with this decent human being who made a 
mistake, not that he could siphon off money 
for his own needs, but for his corporation? 
Is this the type of person that we want to 
put in a prison and a prison environment? . . 
. I'm satisfied from the totality of the 
events here that I'm not going to send Thomas 
L. Monaco to a prison setting. . . . 
 
 I'm going to depart downward . . . for 
all the reasons that [defense counsel] 
outlined.  And the strongest reason, I think, 
is the fact that I wouldn't want to have to 
reflect that I engaged in conduct that caused 
my son to stand before this Court and be 
criminalized.  The emotions and feelings that 
you're going to live with and the peace that 
you're going to have to make with yourself 
and within your family I think is something 
that the sentencing guidelines didn't take 
into account. 
The court imposed a sentence of six months home imprisonment, 
five years probation, $100,000 in restitution and 500 hours of 
community service.  The United States appeals both the 







 U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2) requires a two level increase 
when the offense involved more than minimal planning.  "More than 
minimal planning" is defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, application 
note 1(f), which provides, in pertinent part:0 
"More than minimal planning" means more 
planning than is typical for the commission 
of the offense in simple form. . . . 
 
"More than minimal planning" is deemed 
present in any case involving repeated acts 
over a period of time, unless it is clear 
that each instance was purely opportune. 
Consequently, this adjustment will apply 
especially frequently in property offenses. 
 
. . .  
 
In an embezzlement, a single taking 
accompanied by a false book entry would 
constitute only minimal planning.  On the 
other hand, creating purchase orders to, and 
invoices from, a dummy corporation for 
merchandise that was never delivered would 
constitute more than minimal planning, as 
would several instances of taking money, each 
accompanied by false entries. 
 The district court determined that Monaco's planning 
was minimal because it was "a simple repetition of a simple plan" 
with "no more planning than inherent in the crime of fraud 
                     
0We are bound by the guidelines commentary in this case. 
"[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or 
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the 
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline."  Stinson v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993).  In is not argued in this 
appeal that any of the above exceptions apply. 
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itself."  In United States v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 82 (3d 
Cir. 1990), we stated that the question of more than minimal 
planning was "better left to the district court;" nevertheless, 
we conclude it clearly erred in making the determination here. 
 It is first helpful to look at the nature of Monaco's 
fraud.  We will assume, without deciding, that the DESI fraud was 
purely opportune and focus on Monaco's conduct on the Oxy-Comm 
contract.0  It is undisputed that in late 1986 or early 1987, 
Monaco asked his son to prepare inaccurate labor sheets, which 
Monaco then had entered into NPL's computer system.  When the 
computer generated the progress payment request, Monaco signed it 
and turned it in to the DoD.  Paragraph 29 of the Presentence 
Report, to which Monaco made no objection in the district court, 
indicates that over the next few months he again enlisted the 
efforts of his son a total of four more times, repeating the 
fraudulent billing scheme. 
 The Progress Payment System is an honor system based 
largely upon voluntary compliance.  While complete records must 
be maintained in case of an audit, payments are made directly 
from progress payment requests, without supporting documentation. 
                     
0Monaco asserted that the improper charges to the DESI contract 
were at first accidental, but that when he discovered the 
problem, he decided to allow NPL to retain the money.  The 
Government, on the other hand, points to certain documentary 
evidence which purports to indicate that Monaco knew what was 
happening long before he claims to have discovered the error. The 
district court made no explicit finding as to which version of 
the events it credited, but the overall tenor of the sentencing 
colloquy appears more favorable to Monaco's position. 
Nevertheless, because we conclude the Oxy-Comm fraud alone 
provided sufficient evidence of more than minimal planning, we 
will not consider the DESI fraud further. 
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Monaco chose to have false hours input into NPL's computer system 
so that, at least ostensibly, the fraudulent progress payment 
requests would appear to be generated in the usual course of 
business.  Had the DoD conducted an audit, it would have 
consequently been difficult to discover Monaco's fraud.  This is 
one of the reasons why the enhancement for more than minimal 
planning is provided.  See United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 672 
(3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1226 
(3d Cir. 1991) (applying U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(5)). 
 Moreover, the district court found, in accordance with 
paragraph 29 of the Presentence Report, that Monaco's fraud was 
"a simple repetition of a simple plan" (emphasis added). 
According to guideline commentary, more than minimal planning is 
present in any case where repeated acts occur over a period of 
time.  The only exception is when each act was "purely 
opportune," which has been appropriately defined as "spur of the 
moment conduct, intended to take advantage of a sudden 
opportunity."  United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 
1992) (citing United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 n.22 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).   
 While the DESI fraud may well have fit the exception, 
the Oxy-Comm fraud clearly did not.  It involved a series of 
discrete decisions by Monaco to turn in progress payment requests 
with inflated hours.  At each stage, he had the opportunity to 
consider the wrongfulness of his actions.  See Wong, 3 F.3d at 
671; Georgiadis, 933 F.2d at 1226 (more than minimal planning 
adjustment "considers the deliberative aspects of a defendant's 
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conduct and criminal scheme").  Instead of ending the fraud, he 
continued it.  This repetition makes the Oxy-Comm fraud very 
similar to the example given in the commentary of a repeated 
embezzlement accompanied by false bookkeeping entries.  Under 
these circumstances, an enhancement for more than minimal 
planning was required.0 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 
clearly erred when it found that Monaco did not engage in more 
than minimal planning.  We turn now to the issue of whether a 
downward departure was permissible. 
B. 
 The district court also departed downward one level for 
"all the reasons" argued by Monaco's counsel.  These reasons 
included: (1) the amount of the true loss was overstated by the 
Guideline's loss table; (2) the punitive effects of seeing one's 
son hauled into court and adjudicated a criminal were not taken 
                     
0Monaco relies heavily on U.S. v. Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 
1992), but that reliance is misplaced.  There, a bank security 
guard stole money out of the bank's night depository chute.  The 
first time, he planned the theft.  Sometime later, he 
inadvertently triggered the bank's silent alarm while performing 
his normal duties.  After honestly explaining the situation to 
the investigating police officers, he saw a second opportunity to 
steal from the depository and did so.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held that while the first larceny was 
planned, the second was purely opportune, overturning the 
district courts finding of more than minimal planning.  Id. at 
407.  The Maciaga court noted that it could not find any case 
where the more than minimal planning enhancement was applied to 
less than three repeated acts of fraud.  Id.  Maciaga could only 
be helpful to Monaco if the DESI fraud was purely opportune 
(which we assume without deciding) and if there were somehow only 
a single act of fraud surrounding the Oxy-Comm contract, which is 
contrary to both the Presentence Report and the district court's 
findings.   
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into account by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) other factors 
related to his offense and conviction, namely the loss of 
Monaco's business, his age, his poor prospects for future 
employment and inability to hold public office, the civil 
litigation in which Monaco was named as a defendant, and the long 
interval between the initial investigation and Monaco's 
indictment, which caused him to "live under a cloud."  We need 
only discuss items 1 and 2.0 
1. 
 Monaco argues that, under the commentary to U.S.S.G. 
§2F1.1 (1988), a departure is permitted here.  Specifically, he 
points to application note 11 in the 1988 commentary, which 
stated, in pertinent part: 
In a few instances, the total dollar loss 
that results from the offense may overstate 
its seriousness.  Such situations typically 
occur when a misrepresentation is of limited 
materiality or is not the sole cause of the 
loss.  Examples would include understating 
debts to a limited degree in order to obtain 
a substantial loan which the defendant 
genuinely expected to repay; . . . and making 
                     
0The other grounds for departure are impermissible.  U.S.S.G. 
§5H1.1 states that age is not ordinarily relevant in departing 
from the guidelines.  We find nothing remarkable about Monaco's 
age of fifty-seven.  The loss of Monaco's business, his 
involvement in litigation, his poor prospects for future 
employment and his inability to hold public office are 
consequences common to many white-collar felons, and these 
factors were carefully considered by the Sentencing Commission. 
Moreover, the loss of Monaco's business, if anything, occurred 
despite, not because of, his fraud.  Likewise, many white collar 
defendants must wait considerable periods while their activities 
are investigated and brought before the grand jury.  Monaco 
argues that, even if each of these factors individually does not 
warrant a departure, the combination of all of them does make a 
departure appropriate.  We reject this collective argument as 
well. 
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a misrepresentation in a securities offering 
that enabled the securities to be sold at 
inflated prices, but where the value of the 
securities subsequently declined in 
substantial part for other reasons.  In such 
instances, a downward departure may be 
warranted. 
According to Monaco, the above note applies.  Although the United 
States ultimately lost over $381,000, Monaco argues that his 
intent was only to take an interest-free loan from the government 
and that it was Cortec's actions in taking over NPL and forcing 
it into bankruptcy that turned the advance into a total loss. 
Monaco asserts that the seven-level enhancement of U.S.S.G. 
§2F1.1(b)(1)(H) (1988) overstates the amount of loss caused by 
his acts and hence overstates his criminal culpability. 
 We conclude that a departure based on overstatement of 
criminality by the loss tables is permissible.  Monaco's intent, 
as found by the district court, was not to steal money outright 
from the United States, but to expedite payments that would have 
been due at some future time and obtain a de facto interest-free 
loan.  Nevertheless, NPL failed and the United States suffered a 
considerable loss.  In United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 531 
(3d Cir. 1991), we defined loss as the greater of the amount the 
victim lost in fact and the estimated amount of the intended or 
probable loss.  We then went on to state that "[t]o the extent 
actual loss [has] other, more proximate causes, a discretionary 
downward departure . . . might be appropriate."  Id.  That may be 
the situation here.  Without the takeover of NPL by Cortec0 and 
                     
0We note that NPL's lucrative DESI contract was taken over by 
another Cortec-affiliated company.   
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the subsequent bankruptcy, it is quite possible that the loss to 
the United States would have been far less than actually 
occurred.  The district court needs to make findings of fact on 
this issue in order to support any departure on the ground of 
overstatement of criminality by the loss tables.0 
 We will accordingly remand, for two reasons.  First, we 
cannot be sure whether the district court granted a downward 
departure based on application note 11, refused it based on an 
erroneous view of its power to depart, or refused it in the 
exercise of its sound discretion.  Moreover, we simply do not 
know what choice the district court would have made had it known 
that the more than minimal planning adjustment was required. This 
too was within its discretion.  Hence, we will remand to the 
district court for it to make appropriate findings of fact and 
                     
0 At the sentencing hearing, counsel for Monaco argued 
that the "uniqueness" of the crime caused the monetary loss 
guidelines to overstate the seriousness of the offense.  During 
the colloquy between the court and counsel, the court then stated 
to the Assistant United States Attorney: 
 
I agree with you. Its not a unique crime. You 
know, [you] can't have it both ways: It's 
either unique, or its simple and not complex. 
 
Evidently, the court was saying that if Monaco's crime was 
"simple and not complex" for purposes of the "more than minimal 
planning" calculations, it could not be "unique" within the 
meaning of application note 11.   
 
 "Uniqueness," however, is not required before a 
district court can depart downward from the guidelines.  All that 
is required is a mitigating circumstance not adequately taken 
into account by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines.  See, e.g., United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 
995 (3d Cir. 1992).  If the district court meant by this 
statement that it had the power to depart only in unique 
circumstances, it erred.   
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resentence Monaco.  On remand, the district court may, in its 
discretion, choose to depart downward based on application note 
11.0  See United States v. Stuart, No. 93-7361, slip op. at 9-11, 
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7826, at *14-18, 1994 WL 133633, at *5-6 (3d 
Cir. Apr. 19, 1994) (suggesting possibility of downward departure 
where defendant's culpability as courier was potentially 
overstated by amount of stolen property he was carrying); United 
States v. Jackson, 798 F. Supp. 556, 557 (D. Minn. 1992) 
(exercising discretion and departing downward when sentencing 
perpetrator of fraudulent real estate appraisal scheme where 
other parties were largely responsible for loss). 
2. 
 The other reason for the district court's departure was 
the mental anguish Monaco felt seeing his son, otherwise a law-
abiding citizen with an excellent future, convicted of a crime 
because of his father's fraudulent scheme.  The younger Monaco 
had completed successfully his graduate degree in Business 
Administration and could have no doubt looked forward to a career 
in the defense industry, but was restricted in that possibility 
by the criminal record he received.  In addition, he was 
                     
0That discretion, however, is limited in two ways.  First, the 
district court should not depart more levels than would have been 
required to account for the probable amount of foregone interest 
to the United States.  Second, the court should consider the 
inherent risk of loss in Monaco's fraud.  Although a total loss 
was not intended, it certainly did materialize and that risk is 
one of the losses that a perpetrator of fraud imposes on his 
victims.  We do not think that such a wrongdoer should completely 
escape a sentencing enhancement if his scheme involved a 
substantial risk of loss merely because, under his own rosy 
scenario, no loss was intended. 
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stigmatized, not for deliberately committing a criminal act, but 
for dutifully and unquestioningly honoring his father's request. 
This is not at all what the elder Monaco intended for his son; 
the Presentence Report records that Monaco stressed the values of 
family, religion, education and a strong work ethic to his 
children and set an honest, law abiding example for them, with 
the sole exception of the offense conduct here.  The district 
court believed that the distress and guilt that Monaco would feel 
as a conscientious father was punishment in itself, of a kind not 
adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission. 
 The government contends that the court erred because 
the involvement of a child in a parent's criminal endeavors is 
never a mitigating circumstance, but is instead an aggravating 
one.  Indeed, a number of courts have approved enhanced sentences 
for defendants who brought children or younger relatives into 
their criminal activities.  See, e.g., United States v. Ledesma, 
979 F.2d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jagim, 978 
F.2d 1032, 1042 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2447 
(1993); United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 
1991); United States v. Christopher, 923 F.2d 1545, 1555-56 (11th 
Cir. 1991).  These cases, however, all involved fairly egregious 
activities that the defendants must have known at the time were 
both criminal and would expose their family member to criminal 
liability, such as involving their children in the distribution 
of crack cocaine.0   
                     
0In Ledesma and Christopher, defendants involved their children 
in schemes to manufacture and distribute crack cocaine. 979 F.2d 
16 
 Not all cases, however, contain such outrageous 
behavior.  There are many types of federal offenses that make 
serious crimes out of behavior that might not appear to the 
average person to be particularly blameworthy.  This is 
especially true given the often long reach of federal criminal 
jurisdiction, such as exists under the false statements and 
mail/wire fraud statutes.  In certain factual situations, a 
defendant might not realize that the suborned conduct of his 
child would later cause the child to stand in court and be 
adjudged a felon. 
 In sum, we will not say that bringing a child into a 
criminal scheme is always an aggravating circumstance, especially 
when the defendant did not understand that what he or she was 
asking the child to do violated the law.  The evaluation is too 
bound up in the facts and circumstances of each case and is best 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Thus, while the 
district court would not have abused its discretion if it had 
enhanced Monaco's sentence with an upward departure for bringing 
his son into the fraud, it certainly was not required to do so. 
 The government would have us conclude that involving 
one's child in a crime is never mitigating and bases its argument 
on U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, which provides that when a defendant abuses 
a position of trust, the sentence should be adjusted upward by 
                                                                  
at 819; 923 F.2d at 1556.  The defendant in Jagim invited his 
nephew to participate and profit in a fraudulent tax shelter 
scheme.  978 F.2d at 1036.  In Porter, defendant urged his son to 
rob a bank in order to raise money for defendant's bail.  924 
F.2d at 399.   
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two levels.  While not arguing for that specific adjustment here, 
the government contends that the Sentencing Commission fully 
considered the moral gravity of employing one's child in a crime, 
thus making a downward departure unavailable.  We disagree. 
 The application notes to the 1988 version of U.S.S.G. 
§3B1.3 are not entirely clear, but their overall tenor appears to 
encompass the relationship of employer and employee, not parent 
and child.  Any doubt is resolved by reference to the 1993 
application notes, which define a position of public or private 
trust as involving "professional or managerial discretion." 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, application note 1 (1993).  No mention is made 
at all of nonbusiness positions of trust.0  Moreover, likening 
the criminalization of a child to an abuse of trust misrepresents 
the rationale behind the section 3B1.3 enhancement, which is that 
a person who uses a special position of trust to commit a crime 
is likely to be more difficult to apprehend and prosecute than 
the average criminal.  Lieberman, 971 F.2d at 993.  Employing 
one's child in a criminal scheme generally does not make 
concealment of the offense itself any easier. 
 In at least some cases, such as the district court 
found here, a defendant who unwittingly makes a criminal of his 
child might suffer greater moral anguish and remorse than is 
typical.  Accordingly, even though the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
                     
0The 1993 Sentencing Guidelines are not strictly applicable to 
this case; however, we are not applying the 1993 guidelines 
commentary by their own terms.  Rather, we are referring to them 
to infer whether the Sentencing Commission considered the issue 
of a parent recruiting a child into a criminal scheme when it 
promulgated the 1988 version of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  
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Appeals in Ledesma held in the alternative that a section 3B1.3 
enhancement was appropriate for bringing a child into a drug 
conspiracy, see 979 F.2d at 822, we think the Sentencing 
Commission did not consider this issue when it promulgated the 
guidelines. 
 Moreover, we do not believe that by promulgating 
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, the Sentencing Commission foreclosed the 
possibility of a downward departure in this extraordinary 
situation.  That section specifically states that family ties and 
responsibilities are "not ordinarily relevant" for departure 
purposes.  "Not ordinarily relevant" is not synonymous with 
"never relevant" or "not relevant."  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (race, 
sex, national origin, creed, religion and socio-economic status). 
Indeed, as we recognized in United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 
841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992), when a "not ordinarily relevant" factor 
can be characterized as "extraordinary," a district court has the 
power to depart from the guidelines.  See also United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1992).  Moreover, in 
United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
opined that section 5H1.6 is not "a clear prohibition, but rather 
an indication that exceptions should be invoked only where the 
circumstances are not 'ordinary' or 'generally' present."   
 We think this case is sufficiently extraordinary to 
support the district court's downward departure from the 
guidelines.  U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 questions typically arise when a 
parent of young children is facing a prison term and argues that 
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his or her family responsibilities either weigh against 
imprisonment or militate in favor of a shorter sentence.  Because 
leaving children behind while in prison is a hardship common to 
many convicted parents, courts refuse to allow downward 
departures.  See United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 121 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991); Headley, 923 F.2d at 
1082-83.   
 In the unusual facts and circumstances of this 
extraordinary case, however, it is entirely probable that Monaco 
never intended to criminalize his son and was deeply and 
legitimately shocked and remorseful when it happened.0  This is 
not something that is likely to occur frequently, and when it 
does, the interests of justice weigh more heavily against 
overpunishing the defendant than they do in favor of rigidly 
enforcing the guidelines without regard for legitimate 
penological bases of sentencing.0  For example, in Gaskill, where 
we approved a departure under section 5H1.6, the defendant was 
the sole caregiver for his mentally ill wife.  991 F.2d at 83.  
He was not a violent offender and unlike the situation in 
Headley, where a long sentence was involved, a reasonable 
downward departure would have made a major difference in his 
                     
0We have no doubt that Monaco himself knew that what he was doing 
was wrong.  It is quite possible, and would not be entirely 
surprising, that Monaco had no idea that the "favor" he asked of 
his son would cause the son to be convicted of a federal felony. 
What he asked was a lie to be sure, but as a nonlawyer, it is 
quite likely that he did not suspect that the conduct amounted to 
aiding and abetting a false statement under federal law. 
0See Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to 
the Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, Federal 
Probation, Dec. 1991, at 10, 13. 
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period of incarceration and allowed him to quickly return to his 
family duties.  Id. at 85-86.  Here too the defendant is a 
productive, non-violent offender and a small downward departure 
would eliminate the need for incarceration entirely.   
 The government's final argument against the downward 
departure is that it would contravene United States v. Newby, 11 
F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. 1993).  There, we held that the loss of good 
time credits arising from a prison altercation was not a 
mitigating factor warranting a downward departure for the 
associated criminal charge of assaulting and interfering with a 
prison guard.  That is to say, merely because a prisoner faces 
the prison's administrative penalties for rule infractions, he 
cannot thereby accrue a mitigating benefit in a criminal sentence 
flowing from the same act or acts.   
 We held there that because criminal sentences and 
disciplinary sanctions are designed to serve different purposes, 
such a departure would defeat the goals of the criminal justice 
system by giving incarcerated defendants lesser sentences than 
they deserved.  Id. at 1148-49.  Therein we stated: 
In addition to not being considered by the 
Commission, a circumstance must be a 
mitigating one in order to provide a basis 
for a downward departure.  The gravamen of a 
mitigating circumstance is that it somehow 
reduces the defendant's guilt or culpability. 
It is a circumstance that "in fairness and 
mercy may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the degree of moral culpability." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1002 (6th ed. 1990).   
Id. at 1148.  
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 The government argues from this that because Monaco's 
guilt is not diminished by involving his son, any anguish he 
feels at seeing his son convicted is not mitigating.  The 
government's interpretation, however, would be inconsistent with 
our earlier decisions in United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 
(3d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d 
Cir. 1992).     
 In Gaskill the fact that the defendant was the sole 
source of care for his mentally ill wife did not bear on his 
level of guilt or culpability in fraudulently using social 
security numbers to obtain things of value, yet we held that a 
downward departure was permissible.  Gaskill's situation could be 
described as either "extraordinary" or "extenuating."   In 
Lieberman we permitted a downward departure where the 
prosecution's manipulation of the indictment made grouping of two 
related offenses under the guidelines impossible.  We did this 
not because the defendant was less blameworthy than other 
defendants, but to prevent "rais[ing] the prosecutor to a 
position supreme over the district judge vis-a-vis sentencing by 
virtue of the uncontrolled charging discretion."  971 F.2d at 
998.  It is evident, then, that reduced moral culpability is not 
the only permissible basis for a downward departure.0 
                     
0See also United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 952-54 (1st Cir. 
1993) (permitting departure in extraordinary familial 
circumstances); Johnson, 964 F.2d at 128-30 (same); United States 
v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (departure based 
on age of defendant permissible in extraordinary cases); Shoupe, 
929 F.2d at 120 (same); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 
1332 (8th Cir. 1990) (approving departure based on defendant's 
"excellent employment history, solid community ties, and 
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 Moreover, the Guidelines themselves are replete with 
offender characteristics that will, at least in extraordinary 
circumstances, support a departure, none of which are normally 
indicative of reduced guilt or culpability.  See  U.S.S.G. 
§§5H1.1 (age), 5H1.2 (education and vocational skills), 5H1.4 
(physical condition), 5H1.5 (employment record), 5H1.6 (family 
ties and responsibilities), 5H1.11 (prior good works).  Indeed, 
among the most significant of the non-culpability related grounds 
for departure is U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Substantial Assistance to 
Authorities, particularly section 5K1.1(a)(4), which provides for 
a departure based on the amount of risk or injury suffered by the 
defendant of his or her family as a result of cooperating with 
the government.  Plainly, this factor has nothing whatever to do 
with the defendant's culpability in committing the crime itself, 
yet the commentary states explicitly that assistance to 
authorities has been recognized as a mitigating factor.   
 In addition, the Guidelines Manual explicitly states 
(and has consistently stated over the years) that, except for a 
few circumstances unrelated to culpability where a departure is 
impermissible, "the Commission [did] not intend to limit the 
kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned elsewhere in the 
guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an 
unusual case.  See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual 6 (1993).  The implication, of course, is that 
                                                                  
consistent efforts to lead a decent life in a difficult 
environment). 
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certain factors unrelated to guilt may be relevant for departure 
purposes in extraordinary circumstances. 
 Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 sets forth our 
judicial tradition that no panel of this court may overrule the 
holding of a previous panel.  Only the in banc court may do that. 
To the extent that the decision of a later panel conflicts with 
existing circuit precedent, we are bound by the earlier, not the 
later, decision.  Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1263 & 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, to the extent that Newby's 
pronouncement on moral culpability can be read to implicitly 
overrule decisions such as Gaskill and Lieberman, the Newby 
language must be considered dictum.0  See United States v. Ricks, 
5 F.3d 48, 50 (3d Cir. 1993) (per curiam).  Accordingly, nothing 
in Newby prevents a downward departure in this case. 
 We believe that Monaco's situation is sufficiently 
extraordinary and is sufficiently extenuating to support the 
district court's discretionary decision to depart from the 
guidelines.  Having concluded that the district court correctly 
departed downward, we cannot affirm its sentence outright.  How 
much to depart is quintessentially a question of discretion, and 
while the district chose to depart downward one level, that 
decision was made at a time when the court believed that the two-
                     
0We do not, however, disturb Newby's holding that loss of good 
time credits do not warrant a downward departure.  As noted 
above, we construe Newby as focusing primarily on the fact that 
because criminal sentences and disciplinary sanctions are 
designed to serve different purposes, a departure would defeat 
the goals of the criminal justice system by giving incarcerated 
defendants lesser sentences than they deserved. 
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point enhancement for more than minimal planning was not 
required.  We simply do not know how many levels, if any, the 
district court would have departed.  We will therefore remand for 
the district court to exercise its discretion in this regard. 
III. 
 Because the district court incorrectly found that the 
more than minimal planning enhancement did not apply to Monaco, 
we will vacate its judgment of sentence and remand for 
resentencing in light of our holding that a downward departure is 
permissible on the facts of this case. 
                               
